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Who shapes bilateral trade negotiations in the European Union (EU)? Is it the European Com-
mission, which is charged by the Treaty to conduct them? Or the Council, which has the power 
to conclude them? While some scholars find a significant degree of Commission1 autonomy 
(e.g. Conceição-Heldt 2011; Elgström and Larsén 2010; Elsig and Dupont 2012; Larsén 2007), 
others emphasise Member State control (e.g. Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004: 226–7; Damro 2007; 
Kerremans 2004; Meunier 2005). This paper lends support to the former camp for earlier nego-
tiations, but shifts into the latter for more contemporary ones. 
We argue that in bilateral trade negotiations asymmetric information was a prime source of 
Commission autonomy, which we define as the ‘successful pursuit of a private agenda’ (Tall-
berg 2000: 844). The Commission acquired exclusive information in the pre-negotiations, i.e. 
the phase preceding the official negotiations starting with the adoption of negotiating directives 
by the Council. As this stage in the negotiations is not covered by the Treaty, the Commission 
was initially entirely unmonitored by Member States. This gave the Commission a preview of 
third-party preferences—perhaps even a chance to shape them to some extent—which it could 
use strategically vis-à-vis the Council to move the negotiations closer to its ‘ideal point’, at 
which actors attain their most preferred policy outcome (Milner 1997: 33). Member States have 
later plugged this source of private Commission information through the introduction of new 
police patrols. First, Member States shifted the arena for more political aspects of the pre-ne-
gotiations to annual ministerial meetings. Here Member States are represented either in full or 
through the Council Presidency and can exert early control on where the third party expects to 
find room for negotiation. Second, on a more technical level negotiations are today prepared by 
experts sitting on the ‘133 Committee’2 or the joint bodies set up through previous bilateral 
agreements. Member States initially opposed delegating more powers to these joint bodies but 
in the 1990s began to use them for their own ends. These two changes have turned around the 
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nature of the pre-negotiations from near-complete Commission autonomy to tight Council con-
trol. 
This paper makes a threefold contribution to the extant literature. First, despite numerous 
studies applying the principal–agent (PA) framework to the EU (e.g. Dür and Elsig 2011; 
Franchino 2004; Kassim and Menon 2003; Pollack 2003) and bilateral negotiations (e.g. Dür 
2007; Elgström and Larsén 2010; Elsig and Dupont 2012; Kostanyan and Orbie 2013), these 
contributions focus entirely on the official part of the negotiations. This leaves a significant gap 
in the literature concerning the effect of preceding stages on Commission autonomy. Second, 
most contributions fail to capture important longer-term dynamics (for an exception, see De 
Bièvre and Dür 2005). Empirically, this paper makes a contribution by studying the mecha-
nisms of international trade negotiations beyond the better studied 133 Committee (e.g. Johnson 
1998; Kerremans 2004; Meunier 2000; Nicolaïdis and Meunier 2002; Niemann 2004). Alt-
hough other Council bodies have started moving into the focus of scholarly attention (e.g. Con-
ceição 2010 on the Special Committee on Agriculture; or Larsén 2007 for the Southern Africa 
Working Group), joint bodies set up through previous agreements are so far entirely absent. 
The data for this paper were gathered through two very diverse channels. The first two bi-
lateral trade agreements (BTAs) fall outside the EU’s thirty-year rule and can draw from exten-
sive documentation in the Historical Archives of the European Commission (HAEC) and the 
Archives of the Council of the European Union (ACEU), both based in Brussels. These sources 
constitute minutes and progress reports drafted by Commission and Council officials for inter-
nal use, e.g. in connection with meetings of the 133 Committee or comparable configurations. 
Generally, we found the Commission sources more useful as they reported more transparently 
on individual Member State positions (to brief hierarchical superiors such as the director-gen-
eral or Commissioner). Moreover, we had access to all draft agreements submitted by either 
India or the EU allowing us to process trace individual aspects of the negotiations (George and 
Bennett 2005). Our paper thus presents the first comprehensive PA analysis of bilateral EU 
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trade policy-making based on archival data.3 For the latter two agreements we rely on infor-
mation derived from specialized news agencies, public documents and a document access re-
quest filed with the Commission. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the theoretical 
framework of our argument. The third section examines and expounds it against the backdrop 
of four bilateral trade negotiations with India from the early 1970s until 2007. Finally, we 
briefly discuss implications of our findings in the fourth section. 
 
 
KEEPING THE COMMISSION ON A SHORT(ER) LEASH 
Agents hold various sources of autonomy (e.g. formal and informal agenda setting, exploiting 
preference heterogeneity among principals, or cultivating relations with societal stakeholders). 
But asymmetric information is certainly among the most important. As Pollack succinctly 
states, ‘[t]he importance in this context of information, and of asymmetrically distributed infor-
mation in particular, can scarcely be overstated’ (2003: 26). Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991: 25) 
also note that situations where agents acquire private information pervade public policy-mak-
ing. Thinking in more causal terms, Zimmermann (2004: 75) identifies private information as 
the ‘core factor’ for Commission autonomy in trade negotiations due to the loss of Member 
States’ ability to follow minute details. Nicolaïdis (1999: 91) argues that the Commission knows 
preferences of each Member State better than states individually, which opens up scope for 
autonomous action. Conceição-Heldt (2011: 413) identifies another causal mechanism in the 
Commission’s ability to control, at least to some extent, how much and which information the 
Council obtains. Finally, Elsig and Dupont (2012: 504) and Ripoll Servent (2014) point at the 
agent’s ability to ‘collude’ with the third party. We agree that forming a strategic interaction 
with the EU’s negotiating partner can be a powerful source of Commission autonomy. 
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Any discussion of agent autonomy is incomplete without regard to principal control. Princi-
pals introduce elements of control in the delegation design to overcome delegation losses. But 
all checks on erroneous agent behaviour come at a cost. First, principals face opportunity costs 
as control mechanisms in one policy field means forgoing their establishment in others, pro-
vided the overall resources available are inelastic at least in the short-term (McCubbins et al. 
1987: 247). Moreover, principals’ sanctions are only roughly comparable to ‘sanctions’ avail-
able to agents. Both can negatively influence career perspectives and thwart the other from 
realizing preferred policy outcomes. In the absence of more drastic mechanisms, monitoring 
‘should be intensive so that the limits to sanctions can be offset to some degree by higher de-
tection probabilities’ (McCubbins et al. 1987: 251). 
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984: 166) distinguish between police-patrol and fire-alarm mon-
itoring. Police patrols mean constant principal oversight, in the form of reading documents, on-
site inspections or hearings. Fire alarms, by contrast, are decentralized and require no direct 
principal intervention because rules are set that enable affected private interests to influence 
agent decisions. If the agent acts against stakeholder interests, groups or individuals can seek 
redress through judicial bodies or alert the political principal by blowing the whistle. Fire-alarm 
mechanisms are more efficient for principals and should predominate in PA relationships (1984: 
171). We note, however, that in certain delegation contexts they may be unavailable because 
stakeholders need substantial access to information to learn if and when the agent goes against 
their interests. 
The degree of information available to stakeholders during international negotiations is a 
positive function of the salience of negotiations and the number of parties involved. Salient 
negotiations are of interest to reporters who have privileged access to information due to their 
professional networks. Furthermore, the number of parties determines the degree of publicly 
available information. Multilateral negotiations are attended by a myriad of political decision 
makers, diplomats, civil servants, experts and conference staff. Only one of these parties has to 
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disclose information for it to become available. Moreover, the multitude of parties makes find-
ing the culprit difficult. In bilateral negotiations these factors lead to the flow of information 
being tightly controlled, putting restrictions on the effectiveness of fire-alarm mechanisms. 
This resonates well with Elsig’s (2007: 940) reported lack of lobbying efforts by business 
and civil society actors for more BTAs at a time when the ‘multilateralism first’ paradigm was 
at its peak between 1999 and 2006. Amongst other things, he traces this back to problems of 
access to information and participation in a bilateral setting. With fire alarms being largely 
unavailable, Member States can safeguard their constituencies’ interests only through police-
patrol monitoring. While in multilateral negotiations the supply of police patrols is limited be-
cause of space constraints and institutional rules (e.g. Conceição 2010: 1117; Conceição-Heldt 
2013: 29; Delreux and Kerremans 2010: 366–7) in a bilateral setting the question of who attends 
negotiations when is subject only to the agreement of the parties involved. 
Another useful approach to assess Member States’ ability to control the Commission in bi-
lateral negotiations is to view the Council as collective and multiple principals. If principals 
and agents are connected through one contract, we speak of collective principals. If organiza-
tionally distinct principals have separate contracts with the agent, we face multiple principals 
(Nielson and Tierney 2003: 247–9). This technical definition apart, the analytical distinction 
underscores Member States’ ability to control the Commission either collectively through the 
Council or individually outside EU structures, e.g. through direct interactions with the third 
party to reduce information asymmetry. While we cannot control for this factor empirically 
because we have only consulted Commission and Council archives and not those of Member 
States, we believe on theoretical grounds that individual Member State control is a second-best 
strategy for the Council collectively. Member States with privileged access to the third party 
(e.g. the UK and India) will share information with the other principals in the Council only 
where it expects disclosure to move negotiations in the direction of its ideal point. Where the 
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preferences of Commission, third party and privileged Member State(s) overlap—and we be-
lieve based on the insight gleaned from archival material this typically to be the case as all these 
parties favour comprehensive agreements—no information with the wider Council will be 
shared. Establishing collective means of control should thus be the Council’s clear priority. 
The delegation of authority to negotiate trade agreements in the EU is a two-step process 
(Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999: 480). The first step is from sovereign Member States to the EU 
through the Treaty on the constitutional level (vertical delegation). The second step is from the 
Council to the Commission through the negotiating directives at the institutional level (hori-
zontal delegation). Focusing on the first step in this paper, we note that article 133 TEC (ex 
113, 207 TFEU) is explicit that trade negotiations should be conducted in line with Council 
directives and in consultation with a special committee. Since the Nice Treaty the Commission 
is tasked to ‘report regularly’ to this committee. The Treaty is silent, however, on how the pre-
negotiations should be managed. 
The ensuing dynamic should be incorporated into the PA framework with respect to its im-
pact on the informational configuration between agent and principal. Agents have incentives to 
structure the interaction in a way that exacerbates the information asymmetry, using any margin 
of interpretation in the underlying mandate in their favour (cf. Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 206–
7). Information asymmetry therefore is not exogenously given in the PA relationship, but can 
be shaped through apposite agent strategies. Widening this asymmetry is particularly promising 
early on in the interaction, when uncertainty is generally high and actors’ preferences have not 
yet solidly formed. This behaviour creates a reservoir of private agent information that can be 
tapped into to move outcomes closer to the agent's ideal point, which in turn increases princi-
pals’ incentives to plug this source of delegation losses over time as the agent becomes increas-
ingly skilled at exploiting it. Correspondingly, we argue that the lacuna in the constitutional 
fundamentals has at first enabled the Commission to acquire exclusive information in the pre-
negotiations. Member States have subsequently addressed this source of Commission-as-agent 
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autonomy by stepping up police-patrol monitoring on both political and technical levels. The 
next section will examine and expound this argument by comparing four BTAs with India. 
In the empirical section we focus on the joint bodies created by these agreements. We de-
scribe how they initially sparked off an intense debate between Member States and the Com-
mission. We then turn to their role in trade negotiations today. These bodies bring together 
representatives from the Commission and the Council alongside representatives from the third 
party and take a decisive role in the implementation phase, which is centrally important because 
uncertainty over future actions of other actors make states wary of long-term consequences of 
international contractual commitments (Koremenos et al. 2001: 793–5). Furthermore, bound-
edly rational actors cannot foresee all future contingencies and anticipate exogenous events. 
The result is that international agreements are often incomplete, sometimes setting only broad 
objectives and leaving actors with ample discretion to adjust their positions in the ensuing in-
teraction (Cooley and Spruyt 2009: 8–9). The conclusion of BTAs thus viewed is only a starting 
point for EU–third party relations, which are hammered out in the joint bodies functioning as 
extended bargaining arenas. In analogy to EU decision making they can be compared to 
comitology bodies, which are among the most heavily contested among the EU institutions (e.g. 
Blom-Hansen 2008; Héritier 2012; Héritier and Moury 2011) and have also been analysed from 
a PA perspective (e.g. Ballmann et al. 2002; Franchino 2000; Pollack 2003: 114–40). To our 




FROM AGENT AUTONOMY TO PRINCIPAL CONTROL 
In this section we present four trade agreements negotiated between the EU4 and India in fairly 
regular intervals since the 1970s to highlight the changing nature of the pre-negotiations: the 
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Commercial Co-operation Agreement (CCA) signed in 1973, the Commercial and Economic 
Co-operation Agreement (CECA) of 1981, the Co-operation Agreement on Partnership and 
Development (CAPD) of 1993 and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) for which the Commission 
received negotiating directives from the Council in 2007. Although the FTA negotiations are 
still ongoing at the time of writing, all four agreements completed their pre-negotiations. In the 
first two agreements we focus on the Joint Commission (JC), which was fiercely contested 
between the Commission and Member States. We then illustrate how this joint EU–India body 
was turned into a police-patrol monitoring mechanism for technical aspects of trade negotia-
tions. Furthermore, the changing institutional arena in which political aspects have been ad-
dressed will be surveyed. 
 
The Commercial Co-operation Agreement 
In the CCA the Commission held regular meetings with Indian officials at all levels before 
receiving negotiating directives from the Council. On a political level the talks opened in Oc-
tober 1969 with the Indian Trade Minister Bhagat visiting the Commission.5 Around half a year 
later the Commission prepared a rough draft of the CCA in preparation of a visit by Indian 
ambassador K. B. Lall.6 The document readily states that Indian officials had promised to com-
ment on it, which indicates that the Commission and India discussed the agreement also on a 
more technical level. In April 1970 talks continued during Commission President Jean Rey’s 
visit to India at which he met Prime Minister (PM) Indira Ghandi and several Indian ministers.7 
In September India submitted a written request to open negotiations to the Commission includ-
ing the broad outlines of the CCA.8 Although this outline was forwarded to Member States and 
discussed in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER),9 it contained so little 
detail that it did not significantly reduce the informational asymmetry between the Commission 
and the Council. 
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In March 1971 Commission representatives met Indian officials from all levels in a meeting 
lasting several days in New Delhi. The Commissioner for External Relations and Trade Ralf 
Dahrendorf, who headed the EU delegation, was the first European politician to meet the Indian 
government after the general election of 1971. Underlining the importance that both the Com-
mission and India accorded to their mutual relations, a ‘regular dialogue’ was established to 
discuss EU–India relations.10 After the visit the Council charged the Commission with the prep-
aration of a report on its results, lending additional support to the interpretation that the Com-
mission was unmonitored during these days. The report contained mainly background infor-
mation and hardly narrowed the informational gap between the Commission and the Council.11 
Finally, Commissioner Dahrendorf met Indian Trade Minister L. N. Mishra in Brussels in Sep-
tember 1971.12 There is nothing in the archival material that suggests that Member States were 
present at this meeting. Two months later the Commission adopted a reformist position on the 
joint body, using about half of the entire draft negotiating directives to list its precise compe-
tences in no uncertain terms.13 The Commission considered a strong joint body essential, argu-
ing that it needed the flexibility to take robust measures after the CCA had come into force.14 
It is fair to assume that Commission and Indian officials discussed this aspect in their meetings. 
If this is true, then the Commission and India have jointly developed their preferences on the 
JC in the pre-negotiations, which results in a particularly strong form of strategic interaction 
between the agent and the third party. 
How did Member States react when confronted with the Commission’s ambitious plans for 
the JC? In the Working Party on Trade Questions (WPTQ)—a Council body comparable to the 
133 Committee albeit more technical—France in particular noted that the envisaged powers 
went far beyond those accorded to previous joint bodies. Similarly, Belgium and the Nether-
lands viewed the JC as an administrative body and feared setting an unwanted precedent for 
future BTAs. National delegations warned that a greater number of more powerful joint bodies 
could negatively affect the ‘smooth functioning’ of EU institutions.15 Member States could not 
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have been blunter in their fear of being marginalized. The Commission argued that without 
clearly defined powers for the JC the whole agreement would be void and its implementation 
could not be guaranteed. It even stylized the issue into a conditio sine qua non and threatened 
to put negotiations with India on ice.16 The importance the Commission attached to this issue 
could not have been made more explicit. However, in the end it had to budge and all disputed 
powers of the JC were removed from the negotiating directives.17 The Council successfully 
called the Commission’s bluff. But negotiations for the CCA were not yet over. In fact, they 
were just about to begin. 
At the onset of the official negotiations, Member States were faced with fresh demands for 
an empowered JC—this time by India. Before the second negotiating round in July 1973 the 
Commission seized the opportunity to present a draft agreement to the Council including new 
powers for the JC. France and Italy objected to the provisions in principle.18 In August India 
presented its own draft agreement, which used precise terms to describe the joint body. Among 
the most controversial points was India’s request to enable the JC to ‘improve’ the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP).19 France and Italy instantly voiced concerns over the far-reaching 
nature of this proposal and pointed out that the GSP was an autonomous regime that should not 
be mentioned in any third-party agreement. The Commission drily noted that India’s request 
was not going beyond the Council’s negotiating directives.20 Eventually two declarations were 
annexed to the agreement. The first stated that the EU was prepared to take India’s interests 
into account when developing the GSP; even if not discussing it in the JC. If India requested 
tariff adjustments outside the GSP these could be discussed in the joint body. The second dec-
laration provided that the EU could also channel its tariff requests through the JC to make the 
agreement non-preferential.21 Even if the joint body fell short of many powers that the Com-
mission originally envisaged, it assumed a more powerful position in EU–India relations than 
Member States would have preferred at the onset of the negotiations. In this case the Commis-
sion-as-agent could exploit the informational asymmetry to form a strategic interaction with the 
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third party and move the outcome somewhat closer to its ideal point, which overlapped with 
that of India. 
 
The Commercial and Economic Co-operation Agreement 
The CECA saw three rounds of exploratory talks which together constitute the pre-negation 
phase. The political decision to negotiate a follow-up agreement goes back to a visit of Indian 
PM Morarji Desai to Brussels in June 1978, at which he met Commission President Roy Jenkins 
and the Commissioner for External Relations Wilhelm Haferkamp.22 This again shows how that 
high-level meetings between the Commission and India were the exclusive institutional prerog-
ative of the Commission at this time. India informed the EU in a verbal note of October 9 that 
it wishes to expand the scope of the CCA, again including the broad outlines of the future 
agreement. This outline recorded India’s desire to allow the JC to recommend the use of funds, 
which caused some confusion within the Commission. In preparation of the exploratory talks it 
noted that the JC already had the power to recommend expenditure. The Commission therefore 
presumed that India wanted a more direct financial competence for the joint body, with the 
power to take binding decisions. As this would mark a radical departure from then-current pol-
icy, the Commission considered this outcome unlikely. As an alternative it contemplated the 
creation of a joint fund sponsored by both the EU and India, which the JC could manage di-
rectly.23 A joint fund with commensurate powers to authorize payments was therefore the Com-
mission’s idea, first mooted early in the pre-negotiations. 
To which extent the creation of a joint fund was discussed between the Commission and 
India during the exploratory talks is less clear. We know that going into the first round the 
Commission was prepared to discuss this issue.24 But in the minutes itself the Commission only 
briefly noted that it considered a reformulation of the JC’s powers to recommend expenditure.25 
In the second exploratory round the Commission stressed that the JC could not be given a direct 
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responsibility for EU development co-operation funds. But the joint body could be involved in 
determining priorities.26 The final round of exploratory talks only stressed that the Commission 
and India concurred to strengthen the JC, particularly concerning its role in recommending ex-
penditure.27 
Although there is no direct evidence that the Commission and India discussed the creation 
of a joint fund in the exploratory talks, we consider this the more plausible interpretation for 
four reasons. First, the Commission itself had a pronounced interest in empowering the JC. 
Second, India later proposed what amounts to an exact copy of the Commission playbook. First 
a fund financed only by the EU and then, as a compromise, a joint fund to which New Delhi 
itself contributed. Third, when discussing the Commission’s negotiating directives the UK pro-
posed the creation of a similar fund.28 Although the British proposal was not linked to the JC, 
the Commission noted that India would not be interested in such a fund if it had to contribute 
to it itself.29 This is stark indication that the Commission broached the issue in the exploratory 
talks. Fourth, France insisted on a unilateral note in the negotiating directives that the JC’s 
powers should not expand. Paris clearly anticipated that more in terms of the JC was about to 
come.30 
Nothing suggests that Member States have at any point been involved in the pre-negotia-
tions, neither at a political nor technical level. After the exploratory talks the Commission in-
formed the Council, which is consistent with this interpretation. Member States therefore de-
pended on the Commission to obtain information on this stage in the negotiations. Moreover, 
the Commission had considerable leeway in presenting the results. In the case of the CECA it 
did not include any reference to the JC receiving proper funds with commensurate powers to 
authorize expenditure. Was the Commission avoiding the issue at a phase in the negotiations 
where India was not involved? Has it learnt its lesson from the CCA? Here Member States 
blocked most of the powers proposed by the Commission when discussing the directives; leav-
ing the Commission unable to re-insert them at a later stage in the face of thickened Council 
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opposition. This interpretation is to some degree speculative. But considering that the negotia-
tors of the CECA have probably consulted the documents of the CCA in preparation of the 
negotiations we consider it plausible. This is some support that agents also use information 
asymmetry by controlling, at least to some extent, how much and which information principals 
obtain. 
India made proper funds for the JC and the power to authorize expenditure a key demand 
from the start.31 As this point was not broached when debating the negotiating directives, the 
Commission consulted the 133 Committee which was against the proposition.32 The third ne-
gotiating round was a repetition of the second in front of Member States’ representatives. India 
reiterated its wish to endow the JC with funds to implement the CECA. After the Commission 
explained that this was against EU policy, India offered to contribute to the fund itself.33 At an 
informal Commission–India meeting, the Commission made a compromise proposal including 
funds for the JC.34 
In April 1981 negotiations entered their final stages. By this time Member States agreed that 
a small fund drawn from existing EU resources could be made available to the JC. But France 
was against commensurate powers to authorize payments, which it argued ran afoul of the EU’s 
budgetary procedure. The Commission replied that this procedure would be fully complied with 
when the funds are first made available. Moreover, it was inconceivable that anybody but the 
JC administered the fund because of India’s own contribution.35 In an unprecedented move the 
Commission initialled the agreement against French reservations, including the JC’s powers to 
‘decide’ (a synonym of ‘authorize’) the use of any funds put at its disposal.36 
 
The Co-operation Agreement on Partnership and Development 
The turning point in terms of the Commission’s ability to derive private information during the 
pre-negotiations came with the CAPD. India feared for its position on the EU market following 
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the completion of the Single Market and the increasing competition from emerging market 
economies in Central and Eastern Europe. A host of third countries approached the EU to con-
clude co-operation agreements. But the Commission selected India for the first agreement re-
flecting the EU’s increased competences in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty. 
In October 1991 Commission Vice-President for External Relations and Trade Frans An-
driessen visited India—still without Member States’ representatives—to talk with Indian gov-
ernment representatives mainly about the GATT Uruguay Round.37 The JC meeting in mid-
November in New Delhi prepared the ground for deeper EU–India relations.38 Although the EU 
delegation was chaired by Director-General for North-South relations Juan Prat of the Com-
mission, national representatives were of course present at the meeting of the joint body. Even-
tually a Technical Working Group was set up to explore options for upgrading co-operation.39 
Exploratory talks continued in March 1992 when another EU delegation arrived in New Delhi 
for a four-day visit to discuss several issues, including the kind of agreement to replace the 
CECA.40 The delegation was led by the Commissioner for North-South relations Abel Matutes; 
but for the first time Member States were represented by the troika in the pre-negotiations. The 
Foreign Minister of Portugal (Presidency-in-office) as well as the deputy ministers from the 
Netherlands (preceding Portugal as Council Presidency) and the UK (following Portugal) 
joined the delegation.41 Member States shifted the pre-negotiations into arenas where the Com-
mission no longer enjoyed the monopoly of defining the EU’s position early in the negotiations 
and plugged an important source of agent autonomy through the expansion of police patrols. 
In September the Commission forwarded its draft negotiating directives to the Council. 
Adoption of the directives plus the negotiation of the agreement took only four months, which 
makes the CAPD one of the most rapidly negotiated BTAs ever. The JC’s functions were es-
sentially carried over from the CECA. But the CAPD expanded co-operation into a host of new 
issue areas that could henceforth be tackled within the joint body. In fact, the CAPD is best 
known for the ensuing judicial conflict that reflects this expansion. The Commission and most 
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Member States used the development co-operation Art. 130y TEC for ratification, which was 
inserted into the Treaty at Maastricht. Portugal and Greece contested this legal basis arguing 
that issues such as human rights or money laundering, which were also included, required una-
nimity. But the ECJ eventually upheld the conclusion of co-operation agreements by qualified 
majority voting (Peers 1998). 
 
The Free Trade Agreement 
Member States assuming a greater role in the pre-negotiations continued with the FTA. The 
CAPD was signed in December 1993 together with a joint political statement fixing annual 
ministerial meetings.42 The EU troika led by the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé met In-
dian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee in April 1995 in Paris (not Brussels) for the first such 
meeting with an Asian country. Although the Commission was represented by the External 
Relations Commissioner Manuel Marín,43 high-level political dialogue between the EU and 
India has been wedded to this broader framework ever since. This provided Member States with 
an opportunity to keep a firm grip on EU–India relations. 
What about the elevated Commission position as far as more technical aspects are con-
cerned? The new JC met for the first time in October 1994 in Brussels. Not only were new 
working groups formed which met more frequently than the JC itself. The joint body adopted 
the broad principles of EU–India relations until the year 2000.44 Member States made a com-
plete U-turn and now endorsed the same body whose empowerment they so fiercely opposed 
in the 1970s and 1980s. In a spectacular revision of previous policy, the Council concluded in 
1996 that the JC should be given a ‘bigger role’.45 Freed from the shackles of an inter-institu-
tional power struggle, the joint body saw an unprecedented wave of institutionalization in sub-
sequent years. At a strategic JC meeting in 1999, for example, working groups on telecommu-
nications, air and maritime transport, the environment (proposed by the EU) and on agricultural 
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and marine products, textiles, customs co-operation and the free movement of managers (pro-
posed by India) were examined.46 Member States moved discussions to an arena where their 
place at the table was uncontested. 
Meanwhile ministerial meetings were similarly encouraged as a form of bilateral co-ordina-
tion. At a joint ministerial summit in Luxembourg in 1997 the EU and India decided that the 
meetings should be prepared by senior officials.47 In 2000 the high-level talks were upgraded 
to fully-fledged ‘EU–India summits’ on the level of Heads of State and Government (HoSG). 
The first summit was held in Lisbon, bringing together the Indian PM Atal Bahari Vajpayee, 
Portuguese PM Antonio Guterres (Presidency-in-office), Commission President Romano Prodi 
and the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana. 
The leaders agreed on a 22-point action plan, inter alia resolving to enhance bilateral dialogue 
at all levels: HoSG, ministers, senior officials and experts.48 
Having been awarded the label ‘strategic partner’ of the EU and with the conclusion of the 
Doha Development Agenda becoming increasingly elusive,49 the EU and India set up a High 
Level Trade Group (HLTG) at the sixth EU–India summit in September 2005 in New Delhi. 
The HLTG was charged to examine the prospects of concluding a FTA.50 The following month 
the JC decided that the first meeting should be convened quickly.51 The HLTG met for a first 
preliminary meeting in Brussels in November but the first formal meeting took place in New 
Delhi in February 2006, led by Indian Commerce Secretary S. N. Menon and the Director-
General for Trade David O'Sullivan.52 Although the group was called High Level Trade Group, 
the most senior EU representatives were at the level of Director-General and the talks were 
technical in nature. At their core, these were exploratory talks as found in the earlier agreements. 
In the HLTG, the EU was represented by DG Trade officials active in the JC. No Member 
States’ representatives were allowed to participate in the meetings after the decision to convene 
the HLTG was taken in the JC. But Member States ‘were regularly informed and consulted on 
the issues through the 133 Committee. Furthermore, a draft report was shared with Member 
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States prior to its finalisation and discussed in the 133 Committee’.53 This is in stark contrast to 
previous practice, where the Commission was free to advance talks in the pre-negotiations with-
out interference until it presented draft directives to the Council. Member States have thus com-
pletely turned around the nature of the pre-negotiations. 
After four meetings the HLTG tabled its report to the EU–India summit in Helsinki, recom-
mending the negotiation of a broad-based trade and investment agreement.54 The idea was well 
received by the summit participants in October. Two months later the Commission sent its draft 
negotiating directives to the Council and,55 after only four more months, the Council adopted 
the directives in April 2007.56 The short time frame—all the more remarkable as FTAs with 
ASEAN and South Korea were discussed concurrently—also indicates that Member States 
were involved in the pre-negotiations. In June the first official negotiating round with India was 
held and the normal Treaty provisions applied.57 The 133 Committee could monitor the Com-




In this paper we have argued that the nature of the pre-negotiations leading to BTAs has 
changed from near-complete Commission autonomy to tight Council control. We show that in 
the case of two agreements with India in the 1970s and 1980s the Commission was entirely 
unmonitored by Member States during the exploratory talks, owing to a lacuna in the Treaty 
applying to this stage in the negotiations. This gave the Commission an informational edge that 
it could use strategically vis-à-vis the Council to move the outcome closer to its ideal point 
through two causal mechanisms: the timing of how private information was released to princi-
pals and the forming of a strategic interaction (‘collusion’) with India. If the latter constitutes 
agent autonomy—or is exogenous to the PA relationship and merely a result of the bargaining 
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dynamics—depends crucially on the question if India’s preferences for a powerful joint body 
were, at least partly, shaped by the Commission. The question of whether India would have 
taken a similarly active approach towards expanded powers for the JC without the Commis-
sion—and thereby simply formed one of its intrinsic preferences—may never be established 
beyond doubt. But the importance that the Commission attached to this point provides some 
compelling evidence in this direction. Furthermore, the role of joint bodies in EU agreements 
was clearly the expertise of the Commission rather than India. This lends additional support to 
the interpretation that the Commission wielded enormous influence over India on this issue. 
Starting with the CAPD this source of information asymmetry has dried up. Member States 
have stepped up police-patrol monitoring by shifting the institutional arena to annual ministerial 
meetings for political aspects of the pre-negotiations. Regarding more technical aspects, Mem-
ber States today rely on the JC and the 133 Committee to follow the negotiations earlier and to 
reduce the informational gap. Particularly the role of the JC has expanded considerably and its 
imprint on bilateral relations with India is all-pervasive nowadays. In the FTA the Commission 
regularly briefed Member States through the 133 Committee and prepared a draft report as a 
basis for discussions during the exploratory talks. Member States have thus incorporated the 
pre-negotiations into the same procedural template provided by the Treaty for the official part 
of the negotiations. The Commission could no longer rely on asymmetric information as a major 
source of autonomy in the negotiation of BTAs.  
We draw four general lessons from our contribution. First, future research should address if 
the Commission was able to compensate its loss of influence over the negotiation of BTAs 
through other channels—or if its level of autonomy has been permanently lowered. Second, if 
the EU benefits from the ensuing dialogue with third countries on political and more technical 
levels through the establishment of institutional frameworks in the implementation phase de-
serves closer attention. Focusing on strategic partnerships with the BRICS, Keukeleire and 
Hooijmaaijers (2014: 593–4) find only a limited impact on multilateral negotiations. But the 
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effect with regard to other third countries and in plurilateral, regional or bilateral settings could 
well be different. This line of research is clearly only at its beginning. Third, we see ample 
scope to fruitfully include a longitudinal perspective and archival sources in many contempo-
rary research agendas. Archival material enables scholars more sophisticated applications of 
the process-tracing methodology and allows the testing of theoretical propositions with higher 
levels of confidence. With this contribution we have also shown that archival research is not 
limited to certain theoretical angles such as historical institutionalism (cf. Fioretos 2011). More-
over, archives provide scholars with unique insight into the inner dynamics of institutions which 
should reflect positively on our ability to explain present-day phenomena. 
Fourth, our research yields some insight into the negotiation of multilateral trade agreements 
by contrasting it with the bilateral case. Multilateral negotiations unfold in a very different 
manner and without pre-negotiations comparable to those encountered in BTAs. Nevertheless, 
it is striking that Commission interactions with third-party states before the Council issues its 
negotiating directives are entirely disregarded (e.g. Woolcock 2015: 394). Moreover, while the 
support of certain third parties is crucial, the multiplicity of involved actors makes forming 
durable strategic interaction(s) increasingly difficult. While agreement between the EU and US 
used to be a largely sufficient condition to conclude rounds, since Uruguay the multilateral 
trading system has become multipolar owing to the rise of emerging powers such as Brazil, 
India or China (Young and Peterson 2006: 802–3). This trend could help explain why analysts 
of bilateral negotiations seem more sanguine about the Commission’s ability to shape outcomes 
than experts on multilateral negotiations. Whether the EU’s recent turn away from the multilat-
eral venue towards a more bilateral approach plays into the Commission’s hands depends on its 
level of autonomy in bilateral negotiations today. Our conjecture is that—in spite of the longer-
term dynamics captured by our paper—the Commission still enjoys more leeway bilaterally 
than multilaterally because of relatively higher levels of private information and greater oppor-
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tunities for strategic interactions. Generally, scholars should seek to systematically identify dif-
ferences and similarities of bilateral and multilateral (trade) negotiations from an EU policy-
making perspective. 
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